This chapter examines the prevailing assumption that the value of freedom of speech itself is necessarily only or best served by permitting racist hate speech. It is argued that anything worthy of the label ‘freedom of speech’ must satisfy three relatively minimal conditions, namely, minimal distribution, minimal comprehension, and minimal consideration. If racist hate speech silences other speech by interfering with its production/distribution, comprehension, or consideration, then racist hate speech may function to undermine, rather than exemplify or enhance, freedom of speech. If so, there might be a free speech argument against permitting racist hate speech. The chapter provides a novel framework within which such claims can be evaluated.
If racist hate speech silences other speech by interfering with its production/distribution, comprehension, and consideration, then it can be taken to undermine freedom of speech. This should offer special considerations against permitting hate speech.
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